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 This research demonstrates the revealing of an advanced encryption standard 
(AES) encryption device key. The encryption device is applied to an 
ATMEGA328P microcontroller. The said microcontroller is a device 
commonly used in the internet of things (IoT). We measured power 
consumption when the encryption process is taking place. The message sent 
to the encryption device is randomly generated, but the key used has a fixed 
value. The novelty of this research is the creation of a systematic and optimal 
circuit in carrying the differential power analysis or difference of means 
(DPA/DoM) technique, so the technique can be applied in key revealing on a 
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The increasing number of complex systems in computer applications increases the need for a secure 
data exchange inside them. Those applications use the internet as the media for the private exchange of 
information or data. Cryptology is a science about data safety. The use of the cryptographic application is 
increasing over the year. This increasing number is followed by the need for data movement in the internet, 
among mobile systems, andamong the Internet of Things (IoT). The improvement of cryptographic 
functionsis not limited to the confidentiality and the concealment of information by unauthorized parties. 
Cryptographic functions advance itself in becoming the instrument for verifying the authenticity, integrity, 
and digital signature of a data or information. The advancement in cryptographic functions is considered as 
an interesting research object whether from the application side, the strength, or the technique of attacking 
the said cryptographic application on hardware or software.  
In the past, the attack on a cryptographic system is viewed only theoretically. A conventional 
cryptanalyst generally uses linear, differential, and brute force technique to analyze and obtain the 
vulnerabilities of an encryption algorithm [1], [2]. The cryptanalyst represents the cryptographic algorithm as 
a mathematical object.  
The attacking technique of cryptography on hardware or embedded platform is a very interesting 
topic and very important matter to be researched especially in this modern day. According to statistics in 
2018, the number of IoT devices or pervasive hardware computing is projected to hit as high as 75.4 billion 
devices in 2025. But, there are some potential errors and threat models on those IoT systems. The main 
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problem with the error model is that IoT is a new object so that the security of such objects is not much 
considered in the design phase. IoT products that are available now, such as a microprocessor or 
microcontroller with embedded software, are very vulnerable to become an attack surface. IoT is very 
dependent on the development of a microcontroller unit (MCU) technology. MCU with low power and cost 
will be massively used especially as the main component in IoT devices. These MCUs contain a flash 
memory that carries a relatively-sized program (at least 64 kB). But, the shortfall of the usage of MCU is that 
there is no special peripheral such as true random number generator (TRNGs) or cryptographic coprocessors 
that is needed to improve the security. By that reason, we see a need of an examination on the vulnerabilities 
and the points of attacks of the MCU devices which will be used on the IoT devices.  
However, in fact, when a cryptographic algorithm implemented in hardware will produce high 
performance, it can be mass produced and low costly [1], [2], [3]. Common forms of cryptographic devices 
are universal serial bus (USB) tokens, smart card [4], chips, field programmable gate array FPGA [5], [6], 
and micro-controllers [7]. These cryptographic devices have small dimensions and low power consumption. 
However, unnoticed by IC cryptanalyst and IC designers, cryptographic devices are more vulnerable and 
easily accessible by physical attack techniques [8]. So, the underlying assumption of classical cryptanalysis is 
no longer possible to be adapted.  
The existence of a side channel attack (SCA) attacks on the security of cryptographic devices needs 
in-depth research. Some concrete characteristic leaks are occurring. Some side channel information, such as 
time [9] [10], sound [11], electromagnetic fields [12] and power consumption [13] can be used by an 
adversary to obtain the masterkey stored in the device. These leaks are unavoidable, and it is easy for an 
attacker to measure the value of such side information such as a probe and a high-frequency oscilloscope. 
Side channel analysis is an innovative new research area and very different from the classical cryptanalysis 
approach. Therefore, now, it not only focuses on the security of cryptographic algorithms but also on the 
security of the whole system that is a cryptographic device that implements a cryptographic algorithm [13].  
This attacking technique has shown the overall result of simple power analysis (SPA) and DPA [14]. 
The result produced from DPA revealed correct 48 bit from 64 bit of the overall key (75%). The SPA and 
DPA have proved that both of them can recover 75% of the secret key and the rest could be obtained by 
using bruteforce. The second technique has been proposed in many articles that is by using the correlation 
factor between the traces and the hamming weight of the processed data [15], [16]. In some previous 
research, subkey and a secret key of AES and data encryption standard (DES) have been recovered by using 
a quite large number of traces [17–19]. Previous DPA attacking pattern used a large quantity of traces (>1000 
traces) to get 75% correct bit of the master key. There are some improvements from the previous attacking 
model by calculating the correlation coefficient of the trace and the hamming weight of the processed data. 
However, when calculating the correlation coefficient, the attack must have the capability to fully control the 







Figure 1. DPA Flow 
 
   ISSN:2088-8708 
Int J Elec & Comp Eng, Vol. 8, No. 6, December 2018 :  5144 - 5152 
5146 
 
Unlike traditional cryptanalysis, SCA targets physical cryptographic system implementation. Power 
analysis attacks are one type of SCA that exploit power information changes. Power analysis attacks can be 
launched with simple equipment and attacks in a short time. Power analysis is a potent and useful attack 
against the actual implementation of the cryptographic algorithm on the hardware. From the various sources 
of the side channel information mentioned earlier, such as time measurement, electromagnetic radiation, error 
message; information derived from power consumption may be the most difficult matter to be controlled by 
the cryptographic designer. All calculations performed by encryption devices operate on zero and one logic 
gates. The process of computing encryption and decryption will lead to changes in power form and more 
specifically the logic gate. Attacker encryption devices can monitor power differences and get useful side 
channel information in key space searches. (DPA), introduced by Kocher et al. is a statistical approach to 
monitorsuch power signals. 
Specific DPA attack forms against encryption devices running DES algorithms are contained in 
their DPA study [19]. Based on the results of the study, it was confirmed that DPA attacks are very potent 
and can even be used to monitor thedifference of every single bit of transistors in encryption devices. The 
paper will show how this attack can be used against the AES encryption algorithm and what factors cause the 
vulnerability to occur. 
The purpose of this research is to investigate SCA and to develop a DPA based attack on an MCU 
target that applies AES-128. In this article, readers will be introduced to the idea of SCA in searching for the 
key. Next, we will introduce the power analysis technique with DPA-DoM (difference of means) on an 
MCU. The least significant bit (LSB) model of intermediate value is introduced as a partial means in 
executing DPA. Finally, we made some conclusions about thersefindings and comments about some future 
worksbased on the research results. One topic regarding the future works is about finding the best approach 
in mitigating DPA attack on an MCU. 
 
 
2. RESEARCH METHOD  
This section introduces the performed and lab setup for DPA attacks in this research. Figure 2 as 
shown the research steps used in this paper. The research steps used in this paperwas done by setting them in 
a systematic meansfor reviewing the SCA technique on an encryption device. The test will make a DPA 
attack on an AES encryption device by using a laboratory-testing environment. The environment itself is 





Figure 2. Research Method 
 
 
The expected main result of this research is to recover the secret key after the encryption process is 
finished. More comprehensively, the design step ofencryption device will produce an AES128 device that 
runs on an ATMEGA328P microcontroller. After the encryption device is obtained, the method of 
measurement is designed by making a circuit with a series resistor on the Vground. The next step is to generate 
the clock by sending ciphertext to the encryption device previously obtained. The last part of the second test 
is to do a DPA attack so the characteristics and the model can be obtained and be further analyzed.   
Table 1 lists the main components and setting for the testing. To run and simulate this attack 
technique we build the device under test (DUT). The system’s design architecture is shown in Figure 3. This 
DUT environmentisconsisted ofat least three connected components: AES crypto processor, a personal 
computer (PC), and digital sampling oscilloscope (DSO). The crypto processor is the DUT from which side 
channel information would be harvested by the DSO, creating a traces curve. The PC collects the traces and 
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performs statistical analyses to find the key by modeling the traces curve using key guesses. The DUT and 
the oscilloscope communicate using USB and RS232. 
Table 1. Lab Setup for DPA-DoM 
Variable Description 
Algorithm and length of the key Sample frequency AES -128 bit 
1Gsample/s 
FPGA architecture Xilinx Artix-7 
Trigger signal Header pin with SMA connectors 
Shunt resistor 500mOhm- Stackpole 
VCC-External 5 Volt -2A 
Secret key 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 
PC – sampling Intel i5 with 8G RAM 
 
 
The differential power analysis attack was used in this study is a difference of means approach 
(DoM) was proposed by Kocher at 1999 [19]. However, the Kocher publication implements the attack on a 
DES algorithm that is located in an FPGA. In this research, we focused on a DPA attack on an AES 
encryption device. Specifically, the device is an AES encryption system implemented in a microcontroller 
device. The basic idea of DPA is to make one hypothesis one by one bit of the whole key bits. Next, we select 
a function known as function selection. The selection function gets the input value of the key guess kg, where 
kg = (kg1, kg2, ..... kg255).  
This technique will divide several curves of traces (encryption device measurement result) into two 
sets S δ ≡ mi (t) |Lk0,i= 0
 
and S ψ ≡ mi (t) |Lk0, I=1
, 
and the traces are adjusted to the leakage values of 
hypothetical keys Lk0,i. The adversarywill focus on one LSB bit (a least significant bit) Lk0,i=∈ {0,1} then the 
output of the bit determines where the position of the traces curve is placed. Laying the traces done by 
looking at if LSB = 0 will be placed on set 0 ( Lk0,i = 0)or otherwise set 1 (Lk0,i = 1) [18], [22]. Furthermore, 
both sets of traces are mutually reduced or to obtain the difference between the two curves calculated. In the 
correct hypothetical key that is k0 = k, then the true predictive value will be separated from the shape of the 
whole curve. At the technical end of this attack produces a peak on the differential trace curve and the point 
in time when the targeted operation is calculated ∆k0(t). In other hypotheses the k0, k curve traces will look 
flat. The correct kg values can be identified by looking at the different peaks on the curves of the table (DoM 
traces). Formally, DoM calculations are indicated by: 
 





Figure 3. Setup architecture for attack against ATMEGA328P 
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In this paper, DPA attack techniques use the DPA AES128 bit attack. The number of traces data is 
500 curve traces with information about the plaintext and the resulting cipher-text. The stages in carrying out 
the DPA attack on this report are to observe the first round of the AES-128 encryption protocol. The DPA 
attacks targetis outbreak from AddRoundKey and SubBytes on AES round operations. 
 
Algorithm 1. DPA DoM for 1st subkey k1 
Input : N pairs traces with plaintext and kg = key guess 
Output: Recovered key fok1 
1: forkg = 0 to 255 do 
2:   fori = 1 to N do 
3: Matrixdata( i,kg)← LSB of(Sbox (Ci[0] ⊕kg)); 
4: end for 
5:   for each sample point p = 1, 2, . , M of power trace   do 
6: DoMp, kg ← (S δ ≡ mi (t) |Lk0,i = 1) – (S ψ ≡ mi (t) |Lk0,i = 0); 
7: end for 
8: DoMtrace, kg ← {DoM1,kg , DoM2,kg .... DoMM,kg}; 
9: end for 




In each tracei, Ii, a 16byte is an intermediate state of the output value of the cipher after SubBytes 
operation is performed in the first round. Then, as many as n bytes of each state ∈ {0...15} is denoted by Ii,n. 
The key value used in the first round is denoted as K, andthe value of n of each byte will be denoted by Kn. 
The plaintext used on each trace is denoted as Xi,n. Therefore, the mathematical model of the first round 
observation can be: 
 
Ii,n= S[xi,n⊕Kn]         (2) 
 
D= LSB (Ii,n )         (3) 
 
From the equation, the value of Xi,n is a known variable: one byte of plain-text. Kn is the secret key 
constants. The S variable is the default value of the AES substitution table. While the output of the S function 
is I(i,n) an unknown variable whose value depends on a 1-byte secret key and a known variable such as plain-
text, use of tough tests can crack AES passwords easily if found the value of a key guess is correct. More 
specifically Kn  is an 8-bit value, so at least 256 tests will be performed to confirm the correct Kn value. In the 
16 bytes of Kn that make up all AES-128 keys can be found only by splitting for each byte separately. The 





Figure 4. Flowchart DPA-DOM on AES 
Int J Elec& Comp Eng ISSN: 2088-8708  
Revealing AES Encryption Device Key on 328P Microcontrollers with Differential Power … (Adang S.A.) 
5149 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
MCUs vulnerability with DPA attack is proved in this work. In our test, we have succeeded in 
designing an attacking environment that runs on an ATMEGA328P microcontrolleras shown in Figure 5. The 
DPA technique needs an input of some power trace and public data such as the ciphertext to carry the 
recovering key algorithm. The researchers made a correlation between secret key, public data, and 
measurement traces to recover the secret key. The calculation is made for every key guess. If the key guess is 





Figure 5. AES DUT and Traces 
 
 
DPA is a practical way of testing whether the value of the Kn guessing process is closer to the truth. 
The Kn candidate is used with the equation above to obtain the value I(i,n) for each X(i,n) trace. A selection 
function can be made based on the process of calculating the value I(i,n). In this study, the one-bit value of 
I(i,n) (LSB) is used as the output of the selection function. Each trace is searching the value of one bit LSB 
then divided into two groups based on the output of the selection function. The average difference between 
each subset is then observed. If the output value of the S-boxes estimated by the selection function has a 
small correlation value for the traces, the DPA technique will show the spikes of the traces average indicating 
that the guess value of Kn is true. For every wrong Kn, the prediction of I(i,n) values would not be related to 
the data being processed by the target device. 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of key guessing for the the16th state. It is visible that the key guesses 
index number 61 has a significant difference in data distribution compared to key guess index number 50 to 
60. The large difference is assumed as the correct key guess. The test result shows that the attack has 
succeeded in recovering the whole 128-bit key (100% key recovery). The attacking simulation test is done by 
using 1,050 traces and takes 16 minutes of execution. The key can be directly recovered because of the AES 
algorithm vulnerability in initial AddRoundKeyoperation, which is, basically, an XOR operation of plaintext 
and masterkey. The result produced the key used, and the key guesses from the simulation correspond the 






Figure 6. Global Success Rate AES128 for state number 16 
 
 
Index of key 50 to 61 
Revelead Key 
50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 
Wrong Key 
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The same analysis can be repeated for all 16-byte states (n = 0,..., 15) in obtaining all of 128-bit AES 
cipher keys from the encryption device. The value of the success of this attack is shown in Figure 7. The x-






Figure 7. The comparison of trace averages for false and correct state guesses 
 
 
Figures 7.a and 7.b show a very significant difference between the right guess (blue line) and the 
wrong key guess (red line) against power consumption. The graph in both images measures the value of 
DoM (Y-axis) with trace number (X-axis). The correctkey guesses have the highest level of trace graph 
difference when compared to the average trace graph.  The test results shownin Table 2 represent the attack 
succeeds in an overall 128-bit key (100% key acquisition). Testing of attack simulation used 500 traces and 
ittook 120 seconds. The key can be directly obtained because of the weakness of the AES algorithm found in 




Table 2. The result of a DPA attack 
No Variable Testing Results 
1. The number of traces needed 500 
2. Execution time 120 seconds 
3. A number ofkey bits gained 128bits 
4. Some missing key bits 0bits 
 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The implementation of an AES encryption system in anMCU has a high vulnerability to the master 
key of the AES encryption device itself. A DPA attack is a statistical attack based on the power usage 
analysis required by the encryption device. We already get the main problem of this power-based attack. 
After analysing the DPA on the DUT, we obtained an attack surface on the AES encryption device. The main 
susceptibility of AES128 lies in a predictable power estimation value after the SubBytes function in each 
round. We have succeeded demonstrating it by using a minimum trace and timenamely, only 500 traces and 
it took 120 seconds. The main vulnerability of AES to DPA is in the first roundof attack (after SBOX 
operation). The vulnerability is when the XOR of plaintext and the master key followed by a non-linear 
substitution of SubBytes function (SBOX). The attacker can easily make the empirical computation in 
determining the intermediate value. This value is essential in recovering the secret key. We believe that this 
vulnerability can be solvedby hiding and masking the intermediate value. As Figure 8 shows, we could obtain 
the intermediate value modelled as haming weight (8 bit) for every message. In future research, we will try to 
randomize the intermediate value by using information fusion [23–31] and constant weight encoding [27], 
[32] approach. Those approaches could deceive attackers in recovering AES encryption device’s secret key. 
We proposed that method called as cognitive-masking.  Cognitive-masking is built on the most significant 
power usage analysis affecting a single message encryption process. Cognitive-masking is a concept 
developed from information fusion. The concept of information fusion is to combine two information quickly 
and accurately to get the best value of masking decisions. 
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